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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Regina Maynard was convicted of manufacturing marijuana,
trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, possession of
methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, she asserts that
that the prosecutor committed misconduct, and the district court erred when it denied
her motion for a mistrial on this basis, when the State introduced prejudicial evidence of
a type that the State had previously stipulated not to present to the jury; and that the
district court erred and denied Ms. Maynard's constitutional right to confrontation when it
precluded Ms. Maynard from asking one of the State's witnesses

who was an alleged

co-conspirator or co-defendant in her charged offenses - regarding the penalties faced
by this witness.

Ms. Maynard asserts that these errors, both individually and

cumulatively, deprived her of her right to a fair trial and, therefore, reversal of her
conviction is required.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Upon receiving a search warrant for her residence, police went to the home that
Regina Maynard shared with her mother to search for evidence of drug activity at the
home. (Trial Tr., p.185, L.25 - p.187, L.1.) Police encountered Ms. Maynard outside of
her home, and executed the warrant. (Trial Tr., p.187, L.9 - p.189, L.2.) Inside her
house, police discovered that two rooms of the house were devoted to growing
marijuana plants. (Trial Tr., p.189, L.23 - p.191, L.6.) Police also found scales, a bong,
baggies, two jars containing a "dried, leafy, green substance," and two vials containing
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residue of a substance that ultimately tested positive for methamphetamine in a third
room. (Trial Tr., p.304, L.10 - p.313, L.12; p.338, L.4 - p.351, L.14.)
Ms. Maynard was charged with manufacturing marijuana, trafficking in marijuana,
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of methamphetamine, and
possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.45-47.)

Prior to trial, Ms. Maynard filed a

series of motions in limine with the district court. (R., pp.79-81.) Among these motions
was a request that the State be precluded from presenting any evidence regarding the
presence of a child outside Ms. Maynard's residence at the time that the search warrant
was served, the fact that she was pushing a baby stroller when approached by police,
or the fact that children's toys were present within the residence. (Trial Tr., 1 p.18, Ls. 719; R., pp.79-80.)
On the day of trial, the district court took up Ms. Maynard's motions in limine,
including her request that the district court exclude any evidence or testimony that she
was pushing a baby stroller outside of her home at the time that police executed a
search warrant on her home, that there were children's toys within the residence. (Trial
Tr., p.12, Ls.12-14, p.18, Ls.7-19.) She sought to exclude this evidence as being both
irrelevant to the State's charges, and highly prejudicial. (Trial Tr., p.18, Ls.14-19.) The
State, in turn, argued that this evidence was part of the res gestae of the charged
offenses because it was "part of the facts of the case." (Trial Tr., p.18, L.22 - p.22, L.7.)
The district court initially deferred ruling on this request, but the State ultimately
conceded the issue (although still adhering to the belief that the evidence was

1

There are two volumes of transcripts of the proceedings in Ms. Maynard's case. The
primary volume of transcripts contains the transcript of Ms. Maynard's trial, and is
referred to herein as "Trial Tr." The second volume contains the transcript of the pretrial
hearing and Ms. Maynard's sentencing hearing, and is referred to herein as "Sentencing
Tr."
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admissible). (Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.3-10, p.155, Ls.17-21.) The State represented to the
district court and to Ms. Maynard that it was essentially "acquiescing" to this evidence
not being admitted at trial; and the prosecutor stated that, accordingly, he would instruct
his witnesses not to mention that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller at the time
of the search of her home or that there were children's toys within the home. (Trial
Tr., p.155, Ls.17-21.)
During opening statements, the prosecutor informed the jurors that Ms. Maynard
had initially invoked her right to remain silent upon being read her Miranda 2 warnings by
police. (Trial Tr., p.175, Ls.9-12.) Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury: "You will
hear Officer Andreoli talk to you. When he first contacted the defendant, he Mirandized
her and advised her of her rights. She chose not to speak to him at that time."
Trial Tr., p.175, Ls.9-12. Ms. Maynard did not object to this statement. (Trial Tr., p.175,
Ls.9-15.)
Officer Joseph Andreoli was the first witness presented by the State at trial.
(Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.3-8.) Officer Andreoli was among the officers that executed the
search warrant at Ms. Maynard's home.

(Trial Tr., p.185, L.25 - p.186, L.13.)

He

testified that he instructed other officers to detain Ms. Maynard while he knocked on
Ms. Maynard's front door to announce the officers' presence and then enter her home.
(Trial Tr., p.188, L.25

p.189, L.24.)

When Officer Andreoli first came into Ms. Maynard's home, he testified that he
was "overwhelmed" by a very strong odor of marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.189, L.25 - p.190,
L.4.) A cursory sweep of the house revealed that two of the bedrooms in this home
were dedicated to growing what the officer believed was marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.191,

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

Ls.1-6.) In addition to the plants that the officer thought were of a size, shape, and
smell that was consistent with marijuana, Officer Andreoli also testified that there was a
significant amount of equipment that seemed to be dedicated to the cultivation of these
plants. (Trial Tr., p.192, Ls.4-15.)
Officer Andreoli testified that he then went outside of the house to speak to
Ms. Maynard. (Trial Tr., p.198, Ls.9-15.) The following exchange took place between
the officer and the prosecutor:
Q:

Okay. And when you met with her, what, if anything, did you advise
her, as far as your rights?

A:

I did advise her of her rights, per Miranda.

Q:

And that's a right to speak with you and to have an attorney, those
rights?

A:

Correct.

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

Judge, we are going to object as to relevance
here.

(PROSECUTOR]:

Judge, I think it's fair that he can say that.

(THE COURT]:

Overruled.

Q:

Go ahead.

A:

Initially, she did -- well I read her her rights. She did speak to me
momentarily, to ask me questions, and then she chose not to speak
with me at that time.

(Trial Tr., p.198, L.16 - p.199, L.9.)
At two additional points during the State's direct examination of Officer Andreoli,
the State again referenced Ms. Maynard's initial refusal to speak to police, which the
officer characterized as having, "previously invoked her rights not to speak with me."
(Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.24-6; p.202, L.18.) Ms. Maynard reiterated her objection that this

4

evidence was irrelevant, but the district court overruled this objection. (Trial Tr., p.202,
Ls.19-21.)
After Ms. Maynard eventually re-initiated contact with police, she made a series
of admissions to Officer Andreoli. (Trial Tr., p.202, L.23 - p.207, L.8) According to the
officer, Ms. Maynard identified the plants within the home as marijuana plants and
further stated that the grow operation within the house was her idea in an attempt to
minimize her mother's perceived involvement with the operation. (Trial Tr., p.203, Ls.522.)
According to his testimony, Officer Andreoli then went back inside the house and
continued searching the living room area. (Trial Tr., p.207, Ls.9-18.) While searching
the living room, the officer found a glass pipe; a pill bottle containing a leafy, green
substance; and a red plastic cup that also contained a leafy, green substance. (Trial
Tr., p.207, L.19

p.208, L.7.)

In addition, the officer later went out to talk to

Ms. Maynard again, this time about glass vials that were located in a bedroom inside
her home. (Trial Tr., p.210, L.2 - p.211, L.15.) Ms. Maynard admitted that the vials
were hers during this interview,

and further stated

that the vials contained

methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.8-15.)
Three recordings of the officer's interactions with Ms. Maynard were played for
the jury. (Trial Tr., p.213, L.8 - p.218, L.12; Exhibit 2.) The first track was solely that
portion of Ms. Maynard's interactions where she was non-responsive to the officer's
questions and eventually informed the officer that she did not want to talk to him upon
being read a Miranda warning. (Trial Tr., p.213, Ls.15-17; Exhibit 2.) At the beginning
of the second track of this recording, the officer again spoke about the fact that
Ms. Maynard invoked her right not to speak with police and informed Ms. Maynard that
5

she would have to verbalize that she was the one who had approached the officer to
speak with him.

(Exhibit 2.)

Thereafter, Ms. Maynard made statements on this

recording that indicated that the grow operation was her idea.

(Exhibit 2.)

Her

statements regarding her own involvement were generally limited to allowing the
operation to be conducted in her home. (Exhibit 2.) However, Ms. Maynard also stated
on this recording that the owner of the marijuana plants had already taken most of them
away and that the remaining plants were going to be hers. (Exhibit 2.)
On the third recording, Officer Andreoli asked Ms. Maynard about glass vials with
a powdery residue inside of them.

(Exhibit 2.)

Specifically, the officer asked her to

identify the substance inside these vials. (Exhibit 2.) Ms. Maynard responded to the
officer that the substance was "meth." (Exhibit 2.)
On cross-examination, Officer Andreoli admitted that there were no items in the
rooms where the alleged marijuana was growing inside the house that were identified
as Ms. Maynard's possessions. (Trial Tr., p.231, Ls.14-17.) He further admitted that
none of the equipment in these rooms was ever fingerprinted, so the officer did not
know if Ms. Maynard's fingerprints were on any of these items. (Trial Tr., p.229, L.11 p.230, L.10.)

Additionally, there were no marijuana plants being grown in the room

subsequently identified as Ms. Maynard's bedroom. (Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.18-20.)
The next witness presented by the State was Laura Weddle, 3 a law enforcement
technician that was present for the search of Ms. Maynard's home and assisted in
collecting evidence during this search. (Trial Tr., p.247, Ls. 7-13, p.250, Ls.17-20. She

3

The record does not reflect whether Ms. Weddle was a police officer or what specific
job title she may have had in her work with law enforcement officers. Accordingly, she
is not referred to herein with regard to any particular job title.
6

testified as to her personal observations of the rooms that contained the alleged
marijuana grow operation. (Trial Tr., p.256, L.25 - p.275, L.7.)
In the first room, Ms. Weddle testified that she observed some cut stalks in pots,
grow lights, and a child's wading pool that contained ten actively growing leafy, green
plants. (Trial Tr., p.258, Ls.7-11.) She also observed plastic tubing, a watering unit and
a fan.

(Trial Tr., p.258, L.16

p.260, L.14.)

On a shelf in this room, Ms. Weddle

testified that she observed various chemicals and fertilizers, along with a fertilizing tank
with a hose attached to it. (Trial Tr., p.262, L.9 - p.263, L.5.)
In the second room in Ms. Maynard's home that allegedly contained an additional
grow operation, Ms. Weddle testified that she observed stalks and buds of leafy, green
plant material being dried on metal racks. (Trial Tr., p.270, L.8 - p.271, L.5.) She also
testified that a grow light was present in this room as well. (Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.8-12.) In
addition to these materials, Ms. Weddle testified that she observed 31 plants that were
actively growing

in the room,

and identified these plants individually through

photographs. (Trial Tr., p.274, L.25 - p.279, L.4.)
Ms. Weddle was also present when police searched Ms. Maynard's bedroom.
(Trial Tr., p.303, L.14

p.304, L.16.) She testified that she had photographed some

items believed to be evidence within this room, including two glass vials that appeared
to contain residue of some substance. (Trial Tr., p.304, L.1 O - p.307, L.6.) Ms. Weddle
testified that she also observed what appeared to be a ledger listing expenses, a bong,
a "shake box," two scales, rolling papers, and jars and a cup containing a leafy green
substance inside it. (Trial Tr., p.308, L.2 - p.311, L.15, p.312, L.4 - p.313, L.12.) In
addition to these items, Ms. Weddle testified that she observed a letter addressed to
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Ms. Maynard within this bedroom that reflected the address of her home.

(Trial

Tr., p.311, Ls.18-21.)
Following the testimony of Ms. Weddle, the State called Corina Owsley to the
stand.

(Trial Tr., p.334, Ls.9-13.)

Ms. Owsley was employed with the Idaho State

Police Forensic Services in its drug chemistry section, and tested several of the items
collected from Ms. Maynard's home in this capacity. (Trial Tr., p.334, Ls.14-16.) She
testified that she performed testing on both glass vials that were recovered from
1\/ls. Maynard's bedroom, and that, in her expert opinion, these vials contained residue
of methamphetamine in light of the results of her testing. (Trial Tr., p.338, L.5 - p.351,
L.14.)
The State then asked Ms. Owsley about State's Exhibit 14 - which was
apparently a large digital scale that was recovered from Ms. Maynard's home. (Trial
Tr., p.352, L.25 - p.355, L.17; see also Exhibit List.)4

According to Ms. Owsley's

testimony, testing of residue found on this scale revealed the presence of resins of
marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.355, L.12 - p.356, L.2.) Testing of the smaller scale recovered
from l'v1s. Maynard's home also tested positive for resins of marijuana and for
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.356, L.17 - p.358, L. 23.)
Officer Gee Bourgeau of the Boise Police Department was the next witness
presented by the State. (Trial Tr., p.370, Ls.9-14.) He also participated in the search of
Ms. Maynard's home. (Trial Tr., p.371, Ls.10-19.) Officer Bourgeau characterized his
role in the search as that of a "finder," i.e., he was looking for evidence.

4

(Trial

The actual digital scale is among the physical exhibits that were retained by the district
court rather than being forwarded to the Idaho Supreme Court in this appeal. (See R.,
p.254.) The district court's reference of this exhibit is consistent with Idaho Law. I.A.R.
31 (a)(1 ).
8

Tr., p.371, Ls.20-23.) The officer testified that, when he entered Ms. Maynard's home,
he was immediately struck by the strong odor of marijuana inside the house.

(Trial

Tr., p.372, Ls.12-24.)
Officer Bourgeau then proceeded to search Ms. Maynard's bedroom.

(Trial

Tr., p.374, L.11 - p.375, L.13.) He began his search with the closet in the bedroom.
(Trial Tr., p.375, L.22 - p.376, L.2.) As he pulled a pair of pants off the top shelf, Officer
Bourgeau testified that a glass vial fell out and landed on the floor.

(Trial Tr., p.376,

L.21 - p.377, L.5.) The officer then turned to a small nightstand that had a jewelry box
on it. (Trial Tr., p.379, L.12 - p.380, L.2.) Officer Bourgeau testified that another glass
vial was contained within a drawer in the jewelry box.

(Trial Tr., p.380, Ls.3-9.)

According to his testimony, the officer also found a bong, a shake box, two scales,
rolling papers, and a baggie containing a leafy, green substance among other items in
this room. (Trial Tr., p.384, L.14 - p.394, L.18.)
After Officer Bourgeau testified, the State called Detective Kevin Holtry to the
stand. (Trial Tr., p.408, L.22 - p.409, L.2.) As with the other officers, Detective Holtry
was present for the search of Ms. Maynard's home.

(Trial Tr., p.415, Ls.22-23.)

However, during the course of his testimony, this officer mentioned the exact evidence
that the prosecutor had previously assured the court would not be offered during
Ms. Maynard's trial - testimony that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller at the
time that she was initially contacted by police immediately prior to the search.

(Trial

Tr., p.416, Ls.9-14.)
Upon contacting Ms. Maynard, the officer identified himself as a police officer and
explained to her that the police had a search warrant for her home. (Trial Tr., p.417,
Ls.12-18.) After talking briefly to Ms. Maynard, Detective Holtry then entered her home
9

to assist in the search. (Trial Tr., p.418, Ls.19-21.) He testified that he smelled both
fresh and burnt marijuana when he entered the home. (Trial Tr., p.419, L.17 - p.420,
L.7.)
According to his testimony, Detective Holtry was assigned to search one of the
two grow rooms - what was marked on State's Exhibit 3 as "Bedroom A."

(Trial

Tr., p.420, Ls.8-21.) The detective testified that he observed what he believed to be an
"active grow" operation in this room - the room contained grow lights, reflective paneling
on the walls, timers, a carbon dioxide sensor, plant food and fertilizers, and a number of
green plants contained within a child's pool in the room. (Trial Tr., p.420, L.17 - p.421,
L.9, p.426, L.5 - p.427, L.1.) Detective Holtry further testified that there were additional
pots within the room that appeared to contain just stems where other plant material had
been cut off. (Trial Tr., p.422, L.17 - p.423, L.13.)
Following the testimony of Detective Holtry, Ms. Maynard made a motion for a
mistrial on the basis of the detective's testimony that Ms. Maynard was seen pushing a
baby stroller outside of her house immediately before police discovered a marijuana
grow operation inside of her home. (Trial Tr., p.447, L.23 - p.448, L.13.) The State, in
response, acknowledged that the detective had been instructed the previous day not to
mention this evidence in his testimony, but speculated that the officer may have "forgot"
this instruction. (Trial Tr., p.448, Ls.15-19.)
Ms. Maynard, through counsel, attempted to lay a record as to the visible
reaction of the jurors to this information.

(Trial Tr., p.455, Ls.2-25.)

However, the

district court denied the motion for a mistrial. (Trial Tr., p.452, L.16 - p.455, L.1.) The
court found that the testimony was presented based upon an inadvertent mistake on the
part of the detective, that the testimony merely related a statement of fact, and that the
10

testimony was not so prejudicial as to have deprived Ms. Maynard of her right to a fair
trial. (Trial Tr., p.453, L.17 - p.455, L.1.)
Following the denial of Ms. Maynard's motion for a mistrial, the State called
Detective Clay Christensen to the stand. (Trial Tr., p.458, Ls.5-11.) As with many of
the other officers who testified at trial, the detective testified that, upon entry in
Ms. Maynard's home to execute the search warrant, he smelled a strong odor of
marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.462, L.14 - p.463, L.19.) Detective Christensen assisted in the
search of one of the grow rooms in the house, and testified as to the various plants he
observed growing in this room, along with various other items that the officer believed
were used in the cultivation of marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.464, L.5 - p.476, L.4.)
Thereafter, the State recalled Ms. Owsley to the stand to testify regarding the
results of the testing of the leafy green plants that were collected as evidence by the
State. (Trial Tr., p.512, L.20 - p.515, L.5.) According to her testimony, the evidence of
the plant material sent in by the State tested positive as marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.529,
L.17-p.535, L.11.)
In addition to this testimony, the State presented the testimony of an employee
from the Idaho Power Company, Kelly Stansell, who was a records custodian for
records regarding the power usage of the company's customers over time.
Tr., p.556, L.3 - p.559, L.2.)

(Trial

This employee testified that a comparison between

Ms. Maynard's power usage in July of 2010 with that of the previous year showed much
greater power usage around the time that the marijuana was discovered in her home.
(Trial Tr., p.564, L.14 - p.567, L.18.)
Juliette McKay was the next witness on behalf of the State.

(Trial Tr., p.588,

Ls.18-21.) Ms. McKay worked at the Ada County jail as a Central Control Supervisor.
11

(Trial Tr., p.588, L.22 - p.589, L.4.) In this capacity, Ms. McKay administered the phone
system at the jail. (Trial Tr., p.589, Ls.5-7.) Ms. McKay testified that all of the calls
made by inmates at the jail were recorded; and that each inmate was assigned a law
enforcement number, and then selected their own personal information number {PIN) in
order to track which inmates were making the calls. {Trial Tr., p.590, L.9

p.591, L.13.)

During the State's questioning of Ms. McKay, she testified that two recordings of phone
calls that Ms. McKay testified were made using Ms. Maynard's law enforcement number
and PIN. (Trial Tr., p.594, L.9-p.599, L.14, p.600, Ls.13-16; Exhibit 18.)
The State then called Ms. Maynard's mother, Christine Maynard, as a witness.
(Trial Tr., p.606, L.23 - p.606, L.7.) Christine Maynard testified that she had lived with
her daughter and that Ms. Maynard had approached her and told her that Ms. Maynard
had a friend who wanted to use their home to store a marijuana grow operation in
exchange for paying some of the household bills for Ms. Maynard and her mother.
(Trial Tr., p.608, L. 10 - p.611, L.7.) In addition, Christine Maynard testified that a small
amount of the marijuana that was to be grown in their house was supposed to be left
over for the two women for their own personal use. (Trial Tr., p.612, Ls.6-9.)
During the direct examination conducted by the State, Christine Maynard
revealed that she was facing criminal charges herself based upon the marijuana that
was found growing in the home she shared with Ms. Maynard. (Trial Tr., p.613, Ls.1317.) She also testified that both she and Ms. Maynard had been unemployed for a
significant amount of time prior to entering into this agreement, which prompted them to
agree to grow marijuana within their home.

(Trial Tr., p.619, Ls.6-20.)

Christine

Maynard denied that she had received any promise of leniency with regard to her own
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criminal charges based upon her testifying for the State, and further denied that she had
any personal hope of such leniency. (Trial Tr., p.613, L.24 - p.614, L.9.)
The State then asked Christine Maynard if she was familiar with the sound of her
daughter's voice on the telephone, and if she could recognize Ms. Maynard's voice over
the phone. (Trial Tr., p.635, Ls.13-19.) Christine Maynard indicated that she could do
so.

(Trial Tr., p.635, Ls.13-19.) The State then played the recordings of the phone

conversations that Ms. McKay had previously testified were recordings of calls made
using Ms. Maynard's law enforcement number and PII\J. (Trial Tr., p.635, L.23 - p.637,
L.23.) Christine Maynard testified that it was her daughter's voice on the recordings,
along with the voice of an unknown male. (Trial Tr., p.636, Ls.15-18.)
On the first phone call contained on this recording, the unknown male can be
heard to mention weights and manufacturing.

(Exhibit 18.)

The voice identified as

Ms. Maynard's by her mother stated that she was "stupid" in response to the male's
remarks about the seriousness of the charges. (Exhibit 18.) Ms. Maynard also stated
that she was facing these charges because she was "just trying to make some money."
(Exhibit 18.) On the second recording, the individual identified as Ms. Maynard can be
heard to say that she wasn't thinking straight in light of the "huge amount of money" that
was being offered to her. (Exhibit 18.) She also referenced that the other person with
whom she entered into the agreement had offered to pay her power bill in exchange for
housing the grow operation. (Exhibit 18.) After these recordings were played for the
jury, the trial court instructed the jurors that they could not consider any of the
unidentified male's statements for proof of any of the matters that he asserted. (Trial
Tr., p.637, L.25 - p.638, L.5.)
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On cross examination, Ms. Maynard sought to explore the issue of Christine
Maynard's potential bias, interest, or motive to slant her testimony in favor of the State
in light of the serious charges that she was facing. (Trial Tr., p.640, L.23 - p.644, L.3.)
However, pursuant to the State's objection, the district court refused to allow Ms.
Maynard to question Christine Maynard regarding the nature of these charges and the
penalties Christine Maynard could possibly receive as a result. (Trial Tr., p.640, L.23 p.645, L.4.) Christine Maynard did admit during cross-examination that she had not
observed her daughter directly participate in the cultivation of the marijuana plants.
(Trial Tr., p.650, Ls.1-14.)
Ms. Maynard elected to testify on her own behalf. (Trial Tr., p.671, Ls.15-18.)
She testified that, during the summer of 2010, she had been unemployed after a period
of only sporadic work immediately prior. (Trial Tr., p.672, L.4 - p.673, L.9.) She also
testified that her mother was living with her at that time. (Trial Tr., p.673, Ls.14-18.)
Ms. Maynard testified that she met a man named Freddy Senkbeil when she responded
to an ad he placed on Craig's list and agreed to clean one of his homes.

(Trial

Tr., p.673, L.19 - p.675, L.7.) While cleaning this home, Ms. Maynard testified that she
observed a marijuana grow operation inside. (Trial Tr., p.675, Ls.10-12.) During the
summer of 2010, Ms. Maynard asserted that Mr. Senkbeil approached her with a
proposal to move the grow operation to her own home. (Trial Tr., p.675, L.20

p.676,

L.6.) In exchange, Mr. Senkbeil offered to catch Ms. Maynard up on her unpaid bills
and rent. (Trial Tr., p.676, Ls.7-20.) Ms. Maynard admitted that she was aware that the
operation in question was a marijuana grow operation. (Trial Tr., p.677, Ls.2-7.)
In order to allow him to access these plants, Ms. Maynard testified that she also
gave Mr. Senkbeil a key to her house. (Trial Tr., p.679, Ls.14-17.) She also admitted
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that some of the marijuana that was being grown was supposed to be given to her after
the grow operation was completed.

(Trial Tr., p. 712, L.24 - p.713, L.2.)

However,

Ms. Maynard denied that she ever directly assisted Mr. Senkbeil in setting up the grow
operation or in the actual cultivation of the marijuana plants. (Trial Tr., p.680, Ls.3-7,
p.682, Ls.1-22.)
Ms. Maynard was convicted of manufacturing marijuana, trafficking in marijuana,
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of methamphetamine, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. (Trial Tr., p.825, L.12 - p.826, L.13; R., pp.209-210.)
She was sentenced to five years, with two years fixed, for trafficking in marijuana; five
years indeterminate for manufacturing marijuana; five years, with two years fixed, for
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver; seven years, with two years fixed, for
possession of methamphetamine; and one year for possession of drug paraphernalia.
(Sentencing Tr., p.23, L.21 - p.24, L.16; R., pp.228-229.) Ms. Maynard's sentences for
trafficking in marijuana and manufacturing marijuana were ordered to run consecutively,
with her remaining sentences running concurrently with her sentence for trafficking.
(Sentencing Tr., p.23, L.21 - p.24, L.16; R., pp.228-229.) This left Ms. Maynard with an
aggregate sentence of ten years with two years fixed. Ms. Maynard timely appeals from
her judgment of conviction and sentences. (R., p.233.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when it introduced prejudicial evidence of
a type that the State had previously stipulated not to introduce to the jury, and did
the district court err when it denied Ms. Maynard's motion for a mistrial that was
prompted by this misconduct?

2.

Did the district court err when it precluded Ms. Maynard from cross-examining
one of the State's key witnesses about the potential penalties of the criminal
charges that witness was currently facing?

3.

Does the cumulative effect of these errors require reversal in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When It Introduced Prejudicial Evidence Of A
Type That The State Had Previously Stipulated Not To Introduce To The Jury, And The
District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Maynard's Motion For A Mistrial That Was
Prompted By This Misconduct

A

Introduction
The State in this case stipulated that it would refrain from presenting evidence

that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller outside of her home when she was
initially confronted by police.

This stipulation was in response to Ms. Maynard's

objections that this evidence was both prejudicial and irrelevant to her charges trial.
Despite this stipulation, a police officer testifying on behalf of the State offered this
precise testimony. Ms. Maynard asserts that this constituted misconduct, and that the
district court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial on the basis of this
misconduct.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because Ms. Maynard objected at trial to the State's presentation of testimony

that it had previously stipulated would not be presented to the jury, Ms. Maynard only
has the duty to prove that misconduct occurred, "at which point the State has the
burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).

C.

The State Committed Misconduct When It Introduced Prejudicial Evidence Of
The Exact Type That It Had Previously Stipulated Not To Offer
At trial, contrary to the State's stipulation that it would not present such evidence,

Detective Holtry testified before the jury that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller
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outside of her house at the time she was initially contacted by police immediately prior
to the search of her home.

(Trial Tr., p.416, Ls.9-14.)

Following the detective's

testimony, Ms. Maynard asserted that the presentation of this evidence in contravention
of the State's stipulation was improper and, further, made a motion for a mistrial on the
basis of the erroneous presentation of this evidence.

(Trial Tr., p.447, L.23 - p.448,

L.13.) Ms. Maynard asserts that presentation of this testimony, elicited from a police
officer who was testifying on behalf of the State, was misconduct and that the district
court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial on this basis.
The prosecutor in this case stipulated that he would not present certain evidence,
that including evidence that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller when first
encountered by police outside her home. (Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.17-21.) Detective Holtry
was, according to the representations of the prosecutor, personally told not to mention
the baby stroller during his testimony.

(Trial Tr., p.448, Ls.18-19.)

Despite this, the

detective directly contravened the State's stipulation and testified to this prejudicial fact
at Ms. Maynard's trial.

(Trial Tr., p.416, Ls.9-14.)

Ms. Maynard asserts that this

constituted misconduct that resulted in a violation of her right to a fair trial.
Prosecutors, just as any other attorneys before the court, owe a duty of candor to
the tribunal and a duty of truthfulness to others.

See, e.g., I.R.P.C. 3.3, 4.1.

Additionally, prosecutors owe a specific duty to defendants in a criminal case to ensure
fairness in the proceedings. As was noted by the Idaho Supreme Court:
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to
the jury. They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far
they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing
they transgress upon the rights of the accused." Prosecutorial misconduct
includes asking questions where the answer is inadmissible, but the jury
can infer what the answer would have been simply from the question
asked.
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State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

In this case, the prosecution provided assurances to the district court and
Ms. Maynard that the State would not introduce any evidence that she was pushing a
baby stroller when initially confronted by police.

This was directly in response to

Ms. Maynard's repeated assertions that this evidence was both irrelevant and highly
prejudicial.

However, the State did not abide by its assurances, as Detective Holtry

testified as to exactly these matters at trial.
For purposes of this Court's misconduct analysis, it is of no moment that the
prosecutor in this case did not seek to directly elicit this testimony from Detective Holtry.
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Ellington made it clear that, where the witness
testifying on behalf of the State is a police officer, any response made by such officer is
attributed to the State for purposes of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 61 (2011 ).

State v.

In Ellington, the Idaho Supreme Court held that,

"when an officer of the State gives any unsolicited testimony that is gratuitous and
prejudicial to the defendant, that testimony will be imputed to the State for the purposes
of determining prosecutorial misconduct." Id. The rationale for such a rule is that to do
otherwise would undermine the purposes behind the prohibition against prosecutorial
misconduct by superficially shifting the blame to another party who is, him- or herself,
likewise a representative of the State. Id. Moreover, police officers, as representatives
of the State, owe the defendant the same duty as prosecutors not to present improper
testimony with the intent of securing a conviction. Id.
Accordingly, because the improper response of Detective Holtry is attributed to
the State for purposes of determining whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and
because this testimony was both improper and brought in contravention of the State's
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express agreement not to present this evidence, the introduction of evidence that
Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller when confronted by police was misconduct.
Moreover, contrary to the State's assertions, any evidence regarding whether
Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller at the time that police first encountered her
was not part of the res gestae of the charged offenses, was entirely irrelevant to the
State's charges and, therefore, should never have been presented to the jury. Under
the rules of evidence, relevant evidence is generally admissible and, as a corollary,
irrelevant evidence generally is not. See I.R.E. 402. "Relevant evidence" is defined as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence." I. R.E. 401 (emphasis added). While evidence that Ms. Maynard
was pushing a baby stroller at the time she was accosted by police is prejudicial, this
evidence was entirely irrelevant to the charges that were levied by the State, as this
evidence in no way makes any fact of consequence to the action either more or less
probable.
Additionally, this evidence would not, contrary to the State's assertions at trial,
fall within the parameters of the res gestae of the charged offense. Although the term
is, at times, used flexibly, res gestae is generally defined as "the whole transaction
under investigation and every part of it." State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17 (Ct. App.
1994) (quoting BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6 th Ed. 1990)).
Res gestae refers to events or occurrences that are so related and have such

relevance to the charged offense that they complete, "the story of the crime on trial by
placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings."

See

State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-18 (Ct. App. 1994). Generally, evidence should
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be admitted to show res gestae only when "the charged act and the uncharged act are
so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and complete
presentation

of

the

alleged

crime

without

reference

to

the

uncharged

misconduct." Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Accordingly, evidence does not fall within

the category of the res gestae of the charged offense unless these near-contemporary
occurrences are actually and directly relevant to the charges at trial themselves.
The articulation of the res gestae principle given in Washington v. State, 118
So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. App. 1960), is particularly helpful on this point:
"Res Gestae," is a Latin term translated literally as "things done"; and it
embraces circumstances, facts, and declarations which are incident to the
main facts in the transaction and which are necessary to demonstrate
its character. It also includes words, declarations, and acts so closely
connected with a main fact in issue as to constitute part of the transaction.
Washington, 118 So.2d at 653 (emphasis added).

The fact that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller at the time she was
initially encountered by police does not fall within the res gestae of the drug charges she
was facing. The jury, in absence of the information of the baby stroller, would not be left
with the type of evidentiary gap that could create any confusion for the jurors and this
information likewise did not make the State's allegations of drug offenses any more or
less likely in any fashion.

This evidence was simply irrelevant to Ms. Maynard's

charges and the introduction of this evidence prejudiced her at trial.

D.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Maynard's Motion For A Mistrial On
The Basis Of This Misconduct
A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that, "[a]

mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the
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courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair
trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996). The decision
whether to grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the district court and,
absent an abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal. Id.; State v. Atkinson,
124 Idaho 816, 818 (Ct. App. 1993). The Supreme Court has held that the question on
review is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion under the
circumstances existing when the motion was made; but, whether the event or events
which brought about the motion for mistrial constitute reversible error when viewed in
the context of the entire record. Id.
In cases where juries have been exposed to extraneous information or other
improper influences, the Idaho Supreme Court has followed an approach similar to the
approach adopted by the federal courts and declined to require a determination of
actual prejudice. Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, 837 (Ct. App. 1989). These
courts have generally held that if the trial judge finds that the extraneous information
reasonably could have resulted in prejudice a new trial should be ordered. Id.
Consequently, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the proper standard is
whether prejudice reasonably could have occurred, rather than whether prejudice
actually has occurred. Id. The Court's holding relies on two considerations:
First, the extreme rigor of an actual prejudice test would severely restrict
the availability of relief for misconduct, thereby diminishing public
confidence in the jury system and eroding the fundamental principle that a
"verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial." United
States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir.1975) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). Second, Rule 606(b), I.R.E., precludes a full
inquiry into actual prejudice. As mentioned above, Rule 606(b) bars jurors
from giving evidence concerning their mental processes. Because jurors
cannot be questioned as to whether they were in fact prejudiced by
extraneous information, the trial judge must determine whether the
information reasonably could have produced prejudice, when evaluated in
light of all the events and the evidence at trial.

22

Id.

Therefore, it is sufficient for the judge to merely determine whether prejudice

reasonably could have occurred. Id. at 839. In making this determination, courts must
give due regard to "the policy of assuring that jury verdicts are based upon the evidence
at trial, not upon extraneous information or improper influences." Id.
The evidence that was improperly presented to the jury in this case, i.e. that
Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller right outside of her home immediately prior to
its search by police and the subsequent discovery of an extensive marijuana grow
operation inside the home, could have reasonably resulted in prejudice in this case.
Upon hearing this evidence, the jurors would naturally conclude that Ms. Maynard had
exposed a small child to an environment where drugs were being grown, and this would
likely incite the passions and prejudice of the jurors. This is the type of evidence that
could have therefore prevented the jury from engaging in a rational consideration of the
evidence, and would tend to induce the jury to render its decision based upon factors
outside of the evidence.
Moreover, Ms. Maynard, through counsel, made a record as to the apparent
reactions of the jurors to this information at trial. Defense counsel informed the court
that Ms. Maynard's father, who was present in the courtroom at the time, saw a visible
reaction from the jury panel.

(Trial Tr., p.455, Ls.5-7.)

In addition, defense counsel

noted that it appeared that one of the jurors was herself pregnant, which could increase
the emotional impact of this evidence on that juror. (Trial Tr., p.455, Ls.18-21.) Given
the inflammatory nature of the evidence that was presented by the State, coupled with
the record made of the responses of the jurors to this evidence, Ms. Maynard submits
that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial on the basis of the
testimony of Detective Holtry.
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11.
The District Court Erred When It Precluded Ms. Maynard From Cross-Examining One
Of The State's Witnesses About The Potential Penalties Of The Criminal Charges That
Witness Was Currently Facing

A

Introduction
Ms. Maynard asserts that the district court erred, and further violated her

constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her, when the court ruled that she
could not cross-examine Christine Maynard regarding the potential penalties she was
then facing at the time she testified on behalf of the State. The district court tendered
this ruling under the apparent belief that evidence of the potential penalty for an offense
is never admissible at trial. However, because this evidence tended to show motive,
bias, and prejudice of one of the State's key witnesses, it was admissible both as a key
component of Ms. Maynard's constitutional right of confrontation, and under the Idaho
Rules of Evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
Constitutional issues are questions of law over which Idaho's appellate courts

exercise free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006).
On the other hand, the standard of review applicable to the admission of
evidence under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 are as follows:
Separate standards of review apply to issues of admissibility of
evidence under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. We freely review
questions of relevancy under LR. 401 because relevancy is a question
of law. On the question of whether the evidence's probative value is
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudicial impact, however, we will
overturn the trial court's decision only for abuse of discretion. Where a
matter is committed to the discretion of the trial court, we conduct a threetiered inquiry on appeal. We consider whether: (1) the lower court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
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standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Waddle, 125 Idaho 526, 528 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred, And Violated Ms. Maynard's Constitutional Right To
Confront The Witnesses Against Her, When It Precluded Ms. Maynard From
Cross-Examining One Of The State's Witnesses About The Potential Penalties
Of The Criminal Charges That Witness Was Currently Facing
Ms. Maynard's mother, Christine Maynard, was questioned by the State at trial

regarding the fact that she was then facing pending criminal charges at the time of
testifying against Ms. Maynard at trial. (Trial Tr., p.613, Ls.13-17.) However, the nature
of the charges she was facing, along with the potential penalties of these charges, was
never disclosed to the jury. (Trial Tr., p.613, L.13 - p.616, L.6.) Ms. Maynard sought to
impeach Christine Maynard with the potential penalties Christine Maynard could be
facing in light of the nature of her own charges that were pending in order to show
motive, interest, or bias in presenting testimony favorable to the State. (Trial Tr., p.640,
L.23 - p.644, L.3.) Despite her express invocation of her right to confront the witnesses
against her, the district court simply ruled that any evidence as to the potential penalties
of a criminal offense could not be explored.

(Trial Tr., p.644, L.17 - p.645, L.4.)

Because Ms. Maynard's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her
contains, at its core, the right to cross-examine the State's witnesses as to grounds of
potential motive or bias, Ms. Maynard asserts that the district court's ruling was error.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that every
criminal defendant has "the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.''5

5

Since the right to confrontation is deemed to be a fundamental right, it is applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965).
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U.S. CONST. Amend. VI.

This right necessarily includes the right to cross-examine

witnesses:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the
opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of
being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which
cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and
obtaining immediate answers.

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1395,
p.123 (3d ed. 1940)).
In discussing a defendant's right to cross-examination under the confrontation
clause, the United States Supreme Court has described it as the right to have "an

opportunity for effective cross-examination, not [the right to] cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way,

and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985) (emphasis in original). The Court has
repeatedly recognized that such an "opportunity for effective cross-examination"
includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters relating to the biases,
prejudices, and ulterior motives that might color the witness's testimony against the
accused.
In Davis v. Alaska, for example, the defendant, charged with burglary for
breaking into a bar and grand larceny for allegedly stealing a safe from that bar, wished
to cross-examine a critical prosecution witness (whose testimony had placed the
defendant, with "something like a crowbar" in his hands, near the location where the
abandoned safe was had been discovered) regarding the fact that that witness, who
apparently lived nearby, was on juvenile probation for having committed two prior
burglaries. Davis, 415 U.S. at 309-11. The defendant's argument was that such crossexamination would reveal two motives for the witness to have misidentified the
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defendant: (1) to shift suspicion away from himself; and/or (2) to give the appearance of
cooperating with the police and, thus, avoid a retaliatory probation revocation.
311.

Id. at

Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the state trial court had violated the

defendant's right to confrontation by precluding the defendant's desired crossexa mination:
We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the
credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of reasoning had
counsel been permitted to fully present it. But we do conclude that the
jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them
so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on
[the witness's] testimony which provided "a crucial link in the proof ... of
petitioner's act." Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S., at 419, 85 S.Ct., at 1077.
The accuracy and truthfulness of [the witness's] testimony were key
elements in the State's case against petitioner. The claim of bias which
the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a basis for an
inference of undue pressure because of Green's vulnerable status as a
probationer, cf Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75
L.Ed. 624 (1931), as well as of Green's possible concern that he might be
a suspect in the investigation.
Id. at 317-18 (footnote omitted).

Later, in Delaware v. Van Arsda/1, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), the Court reaffirmed its
holding from Davis. In Van Arsda/1, the defendant had sought to impeach the testimony
of a prosecution witness by cross-examining that witness about the fact that a criminal
charge against him had been dismissed after he had agreed to speak to the prosecutor
about the defendant's case; however, the defendant's proposed cross-examination had
been barred by the trial court based on Delaware Rule of Evidence 403. 6 Id. at 676-77.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant's right to confrontation had been violated
because "a jury might reasonably have found" that the government's dismissal of the

6

The version of Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 then in effect was substantively
identical to the current version of Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. (Compare Van Arsda/1,
475 U.S. at 676-77 n.2 (quoting the Delaware Rule) with I.R.E. 403.)
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pending criminal charge "furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in
his testimony .... " Id. at 679.
The Idaho Court of Appeals, adhering to Davis and Van Arsda/1, has likewise
recognized that such an "opportunity for effective cross-examination" includes the right
to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters relating to any biases, prejudices, and
ulterior motives that might color their testimony against the accused. See, e.g., State v.
Harshbarger, 139 Idaho 287, 293-94 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding a confrontation clause

violation where the district court precluded the defendant from cross-examining a
government witness regarding felony charges against that witness that had been
reduced to misdemeanors and eventually dismissed altogether because exploration of
that topic could have raised an inference that the witness testified favorably for the State
based on her implied understanding or expectation of what would happen with regard to
her own case); State v. Green, 136 Idaho 553, 556-57 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding a
confrontation clause violation where the district court precluded the defendant from
cross-examining a government witness regarding a felony charge pending against that
witness because the existence of the charge provided some motivation for the witness
to testify to the State's liking).
At their core, each of these holdings recognize that the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses encompasses the right not only to ask whether the witness
was biased, but to explore and make a full record as to why the witness may be biased
or otherwise motivated to shade their testimony in favor of the State. See Davis, 415
U.S. at 318.

In this case, the seriousness and nature of the charges that Christine

Maynard was facing was critical information that could have easily provided a powerful
motive for her to seek to provide testimony that would be favorable to the State.
28

Because of this, Ms. Maynard had a constitutional right to explore this as a potential
ground of impeachment during her cross-examination of Christine Maynard at trial.

D.

The District Court Erred, And Violated The Idaho Rules Of Evidence, When It
Precluded Ms. Maynard From Cross-Examining One Of The State's Key
Witnesses Regarding That Witness's Potenial Bias, Prejudice, And Motive For
Testifying On Behalf Of The State
Similarly, because the evidence that Ms. Maynard sought to cross-examine her

mother on was relevant to the issue of Christine Maynard's potential motive, bias, or
interest in providing testimony favorable to the State, this evidence was admissible
pursuant to the Rule of Evidence as well.

However, the district court in this case

appears to have labored under the misperception that all evidence of the potential
penalties of an offense is always inadmissible at trial.

(Trial Tr., p.643, Ls.8-24.)

Ms. Maynard submits that this was error on the part of the trial court, and that the Idaho
Supreme Court Opinion in State v. Ruiz is dispositive on this point.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence govern the admission of all evidence in the trial
courts of Idaho. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010). As a general principle, all
relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless otherwise expressly precluded by these
rules. See I.R.

402. Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 provides that "relevant evidence" is

"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." 1.R.E. 401.
Under this standard, allegations of criminal conduct against the State's
witnesses, as well as any agreements that might exist between those witnesses and the
State with relation to those allegations of criminal conduct, constitute "relevant
evidence" under Rule 401 because they make it less probable that the State's witness is
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credible - a fact which is always of consequence to the determination of the action.
See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 671, 675 (2002) (finding to be relevant the fact

that two government witnesses had grown marijuana and the government may have
promised not to prosecute them in exchange for their cooperation in the case against
the defendant); cf., e.g., Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (in the context of the Constitutional right
to confrontation, holding that "[t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial,
and is 'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his
testimony"') (quoting 3A J. Wigmore, evidence§ 940, p.775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)).
In addition, the district court in this case failed to conduct the necessary
balancing test pursuant to I.RE. 403 prior to excluding the evidence that Ms. Maynard
sought to elicit through cross-examination.

Faced with nearly identical facts as are

present in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court has held this is error. Ruiz, 150 Idaho at
471.
In Ruiz, like this case, the State presented the testimony of a witness who was
faced with the same charges as the defendant based upon their joint involvement in
drug activity.

Id. at 470.

And like this case, the trial court in Ruiz precluded the

defendant from questioning this witness regarding the potential penalties that the
witness faced for these charges at the time of his testimony. Id. The defendant in Ruiz
challenged the exclusion of this evidence on grounds of both his constitutional right of
confrontation and because the exclusion of this evidence was contrary to the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Id. at 470-471.
The Ruiz Court held that the failure of the trial court to conduct a proper analysis
pursuant to I.R.E. 403 was dispositive.

Id. at 471.
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Specifically, the Court held that,

because the trial court, ''excluded the evidence without conducting the analysis required
by Rule 403, the district court erred." Id. at 471. This Court should do the same.
Moreover, while the trial court in this case ruled that it had already determined
that the issue of potential penalties could not be presented to the jury, the court failed to
recognize that this ruling came in the context of discussing the potential sentence that
Ms. Maynard was directly facing as a result of the charges at trial - not the potential

penalties faced by any other witness who may have a motive to shade their testimony in
light of the State given their own criminal charges.

(Trial Tr., p.28, Ls.16-6; p.643,

Ls.23-24.) Because the trial court in this case never conducted the proper weighing test
regarding the admissibility of evidence of the nature of the charges and penalties faced
by Christine Maynard as it related to her potential motives in presenting testimony for
the State, the district court erred in categorically excluding this evidence at trial.

111.
The Cumulative Effect Of The Errors In Ms. Maynard's Case Requires Reversal Of Her
Convictions
Ms. Maynard asserts that, even if this Court determines that none of the errors
individually warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of these errors deprived Ms. Maynard
of her due process right to a fair trial and therefore reversal is required.
"Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at
230. In this case, there were multiple errors occurring at trial, each one impacting on
Ms. Maynard's right to a fair trial. Accordingly, Ms. Maynard asserts that the cumulative
effect of the errors in her case require reversal of her conviction.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Maynard respectfully requests that this Court reverse her judgments of
conviction and sentences, and remand her case for further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2012.

SARAH E. TOM~INS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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